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Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography MPTC

Overview

The multi-party paradigm of threshold cryptography enables threshold schemes, which apply principles of secure multiparty computation (MPC) to achieve protocols that enable a secure distribution of trust in the operation of cryptographic primitives. Threshold schemes can be applied to NIST standardized primitives/schemes, and beyond. The technical scope of the MPTC-project includes threshold schemes (for signatures, public-key encryption/decryption, ciphers, hashing, fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE), and key-generation), as well as auxiliary techniques (such as zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) and other gadgets).

Current Highlights


The multi-party threshold paradigm

Using a “secret sharing” mechanism, the secret key is split across multiple "parties". Then, if some (up to a threshold f out of n) of these parties are corrupted, the key secrecy remains uncompromised. The cryptographic operation that depends on the key is then performed via a threshold scheme, using secure multi-party computation (MPC), so that the key does not have to be reconstructed (i.e., the secret-sharing remains in place even during the computation). This threshold approach can be used to distribute trust across various operators, preventing any operator from being a critical point of failure.

Which cryptographic primitives can be thresholdized?

Threshold schemes can be applied to any cryptographic primitive, such as key generation, signing, encryption and decryption. The MPTC project will consider devising recommendations and guidelines pertinent to threshold schemes that are interchangeable (in the sense of NIST IR 8214A, Section 2.4) with selected primitives of interest. For example, a threshold-produced signature should be verifiable by the verification algorithm that is used for signatures produced by the conventional (non-threshold) algorithm. The particular case of signatures interchangeable with EdDSA is discussed in the report Notes of Threshold EdDSA/Schnorr Signatures (NIST IR 8214B ipd).

The NIST Threshold Call (NIST IR 8214C) establishes a structured process to collect reference material about threshold schemes.

Project Progress and Milestones

Documents:

Presentations:

Note: The old "single-device track" about masked circuits for block-ciphers has become a separate project.

Each NIST-organized workshop has a dedicated webpage with detailed information. These events are also listed in the "Events" page associated with the MPTC project.

  • MPTS 20206: NIST Workshop on Multi-Party Threshold Schemes 2026 (January 26–29)
  • MPTS 2023: NIST Workshop on Multi-Party Threshold Schemes 2023 (September 26–28)
    • Held virtually, including 36 slots: 26 external talks, 1 open session of comments, 4 talks on NIST activities, 3 internal notes about the Threshold Call, 1 opening and 1 closing session.
    • The presentations included feedback about the Draft NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes.
    • There was a call for presentation abstracts, with a deadline of 2023-Sep-05.
  • MPTS 2020: NIST Workshop on Multi-Party Threshold Schemes 2020 (November 4–6)
    • Held virtually, including 17 invited talks and 11 accepted briefs.
    • The presentations provided feedback toward criteria for multi-party threshold schemes.
    • The workshop announcement informed a deadline for submissions by 2020-Sep-30.
  • NTCW 2019: NIST Threshold Cryptography Workshop 2019 (March 11–12)
    • Held in person, at the NIST campus in Gaithersburg Maryland, USA.
    • Participants: with experts from industry, academia, and government.
    • The submission deadline was December 17, 2018.
    • Note: this workshop relates to an older exploratory phase, whose scope included multi-party threshold schemes and single-party masked implementations

NIST Internal Reports (NISTIR):

So far, the main publications in the project are in the form of NIST Internal Reports (NISTIR), elaborated internally at NIST and made publicly available for comments and consultation.

  • NIST IR 8214C: NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes
  • NISTIR 8214B: Notes on Threshold EdDSA/Schnorr Signatures
  • NISTIR 8214A: NIST Roadmap Toward Criteria for Threshold Schemes for Cryptographic Primitives.
    • Note: Discusses the pertinence of considering the standardization of threshold schemes for cryptographic primitives.
    • NISTIR 8214A (Final version): Published on 2020-Jul-07. DOI:10.6028/NIST.IR.8214A.
    • Draft version: Published in the CSRC on 2019-Nov-08. DOI:10.6028/NIST.IR.8214A-draftDiff and public comments. The available "diff" highlights differences between the draft and the final version and includes a table with the received comments. The title in the draft was "Towards NIST Standards for Threshold Schemes for Cryptographic Primitives: A Preliminary Roadmap", which changed in the final version.
  • NISTIR 8214: Threshold Schemes for Cryptographic Primitives: Challenges and Opportunities in Standardization and Validation of Threshold Cryptography.
    • Note: presents a structured approach for exploring the space of threshold schemes for potential standardization, across two tracks: multi-party and single-device.
    • NISTIR 8214 (Final version): Published on 2019-Mar-01. DOI:10.6028/NIST.IR.8214
    • Draft version: Published on 2019-Jul-26Diff and public comments. The available "diff" highlights differences between the draft and the final version and includes a table with the received comments.

The MPTC project intends to drive an open and transparent process (see IR 7977), welcoming and considering feedback from the community of stakeholders, including researchers and practitioners in academia, industry and government. The project has received useful community feedback about the multi-party threshold setting, including the references listed below:

MPTC forum

To receive announcements pertinent to opportunities for collaboration, feedback, and workshops, consider subscribing to the MPTC-forum. The messages are publicly available at https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/mptc-forum

Call 2021a for Feedback on Criteria for Threshold Schemes:

An earlier related call for focused feedback on criteria for threshold schemes (Call 2021a) solicited anticipated comments on the following topics: scope of proposals; security idealization; security vs. adversary types; system model; threshold profiles; building blocks.

Feedback about NISTIR’s

The NIST reports on threshold schemes have benefited from public comments, as described in:

Feedback in NIST workshops

Topics of various presentation at NTCW 2019, MPTS 2020, MPTS 2023, WPEC 2024:

  • Standardization setting: [2019] I1.2 (TC readiness); [2020] 2a1 (MPC settings), 2a2 (composability); [2023] 1a1 (diversity).

  • Threshold RSA keygen: 1a3 (honest majority threshold schemes).

  • Threshold ECDSA: [2019] I4.2, I.5.1 (a, b, c); [2020] 3a2, 3a3, 3c1, 3c2; [2023] 1b3, 1b4.

  • Threshold Schnorr/EdDSA: [2019] II4; [2020] 1b2 (MPC-based), 1b3 (prob.), 1c1; [2023] 1b2 (prob.).

  • Threshold AES: [2020] 2b3; [2023] 1a4.

  • Threshold RSA keygen: [2020] 3b1, 3b2.

  • Threshold DL Keygen: [2023] 1b1.

  • PEC-related: [2023] 2a1, 2a2 and 3c1 (FHE), 2a3 and 2a4 (ZKP), 2a5 (ABE)

  • Threshold for other primitives: [2023] 1b5 (BLS).

  • Gadgets / building blocks: [2020]: 2b2+2c1 (garbled circuits), OT (2b1), PCG (2a3), PVSS (1a2); [2023] 3a1 (auth garbling), 3a2 (stacked garbling), 3a3 (garbled lookup tables), 3a4 (VOLE), 3c2 (AONT), 3c3 (VORF), 3c5 (networking).

  • Platforms/frameworks/endeavors: [2019] I1.3, II4.3; [2020] 3b3 (frameworks), 2c2, 2c3, 2c4, 2c5 (MPC Alliance); [2023] 1a2 (SPDZ), [2024] 3a5 (MPC Alliance).

  • Attacks: [2020] 3a1 (attacks), 2b2 (key-extraction).

  • Theory: [2019] II4.1 (multi-signatures); [2023] 2b3 (random-oracle); [2024] 3a2 (tutorial)

  • Threshold post-quantum: [2019] I3.1; [2020] 1c2, 1c3.

  • Others applications/comments: [2019] II4.4; [2020] 1b1, 1c4; [2023] 1a3, 2b1 (TLS).

  • Secret sharing variants: II3.1 (leakage resilient)

  • Variants: [2019] I4.1 (signatures), II3.2 (symmetric encryption), II4.2 (signing).

NIST presentations:

  • NIST standards related: [2019] I2.1 (approach), I6.1 (validation) I2.2 (PQC & EC); [2023] 2c1 & 2c2 (PQC), 2c3 (LWC), 2c4 (Validation), 2a0 (PEC tools), 3a0 (gadgets).

  • Intros about the threshold-crypto project or call: [2019] I1.1, [2020] 1a1; [2023] 101.

Legend of indices:

- For NTCW 2019, indices are Xyz, with X in {I, II} (day), y in {1,…,5} (session in the day), z in {1,2,3}.

- For MPTS 2020 and MPTS 2023, indices are xyz, with x in {0, 1,2,3} (day), y in {a,b,c,d} (session in the day), z in {0,…,5}.

Contacts

Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography (MPTC) Project
[email protected]

Luís T. A. N. Brandão - NIST/Strativia
[email protected]

Michael Davidson - NIST

René Peralta - NIST

Dustin Moody - NIST

Created July 26, 2018, Updated March 02, 2026