The multi-party paradigm of threshold cryptography enables threshold schemes, which apply principles of secure multiparty computation (MPC) to achieve protocols that enable a secure distribution of trust in the operation of cryptographic primitives. Threshold schemes can be applied to NIST standardized primitives/schemes, and beyond. The technical scope of the MPTC-project includes threshold schemes (for signatures, public-key encryption/decryption, ciphers, hashing, fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE), and key-generation), as well as auxiliary techniques (such as zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) and other gadgets).
MPTS 2026: The NIST Workshop on Multi-Party Threshold Schemes 2026, on January 26–29, hosted 45 virtual talks.
Using a “secret sharing” mechanism, the secret key is split across multiple "parties". Then, if some (up to a threshold f out of n) of these parties are corrupted, the key secrecy remains uncompromised. The cryptographic operation that depends on the key is then performed via a threshold scheme, using secure multi-party computation (MPC), so that the key does not have to be reconstructed (i.e., the secret-sharing remains in place even during the computation). This threshold approach can be used to distribute trust across various operators, preventing any operator from being a critical point of failure.
Threshold schemes can be applied to any cryptographic primitive, such as key generation, signing, encryption and decryption. The MPTC project will consider devising recommendations and guidelines pertinent to threshold schemes that are interchangeable (in the sense of NIST IR 8214A, Section 2.4) with selected primitives of interest. For example, a threshold-produced signature should be verifiable by the verification algorithm that is used for signatures produced by the conventional (non-threshold) algorithm. The particular case of signatures interchangeable with EdDSA is discussed in the report Notes of Threshold EdDSA/Schnorr Signatures (NIST IR 8214B ipd).
The NIST Threshold Call (NIST IR 8214C) establishes a structured process to collect reference material about threshold schemes.
Documents:
Presentations:
Note: The old "single-device track" about masked circuits for block-ciphers has become a separate project.
Each NIST-organized workshop has a dedicated webpage with detailed information. These events are also listed in the "Events" page associated with the MPTC project.
NIST Internal Reports (NISTIR):
So far, the main publications in the project are in the form of NIST Internal Reports (NISTIR), elaborated internally at NIST and made publicly available for comments and consultation.
The MPTC project intends to drive an open and transparent process (see IR 7977), welcoming and considering feedback from the community of stakeholders, including researchers and practitioners in academia, industry and government. The project has received useful community feedback about the multi-party threshold setting, including the references listed below:
To receive announcements pertinent to opportunities for collaboration, feedback, and workshops, consider subscribing to the MPTC-forum. The messages are publicly available at https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/mptc-forum
An earlier related call for focused feedback on criteria for threshold schemes (Call 2021a) solicited anticipated comments on the following topics: scope of proposals; security idealization; security vs. adversary types; system model; threshold profiles; building blocks.
The NIST reports on threshold schemes have benefited from public comments, as described in:
Topics of various presentation at NTCW 2019, MPTS 2020, MPTS 2023, WPEC 2024:
Standardization setting: [2019] I1.2 (TC readiness); [2020] 2a1 (MPC settings), 2a2 (composability); [2023] 1a1 (diversity).
Threshold RSA keygen: 1a3 (honest majority threshold schemes).
Threshold ECDSA: [2019] I4.2, I.5.1 (a, b, c); [2020] 3a2, 3a3, 3c1, 3c2; [2023] 1b3, 1b4.
Threshold Schnorr/EdDSA: [2019] II4; [2020] 1b2 (MPC-based), 1b3 (prob.), 1c1; [2023] 1b2 (prob.).
Threshold DL Keygen: [2023] 1b1.
PEC-related: [2023] 2a1, 2a2 and 3c1 (FHE), 2a3 and 2a4 (ZKP), 2a5 (ABE)
Threshold for other primitives: [2023] 1b5 (BLS).
Gadgets / building blocks: [2020]: 2b2+2c1 (garbled circuits), OT (2b1), PCG (2a3), PVSS (1a2); [2023] 3a1 (auth garbling), 3a2 (stacked garbling), 3a3 (garbled lookup tables), 3a4 (VOLE), 3c2 (AONT), 3c3 (VORF), 3c5 (networking).
Platforms/frameworks/endeavors: [2019] I1.3, II4.3; [2020] 3b3 (frameworks), 2c2, 2c3, 2c4, 2c5 (MPC Alliance); [2023] 1a2 (SPDZ), [2024] 3a5 (MPC Alliance).
Theory: [2019] II4.1 (multi-signatures); [2023] 2b3 (random-oracle); [2024] 3a2 (tutorial)
Others applications/comments: [2019] II4.4; [2020] 1b1, 1c4; [2023] 1a3, 2b1 (TLS).
Secret sharing variants: II3.1 (leakage resilient)
Variants: [2019] I4.1 (signatures), II3.2 (symmetric encryption), II4.2 (signing).
NIST presentations:
NIST standards related: [2019] I2.1 (approach), I6.1 (validation) I2.2 (PQC & EC); [2023] 2c1 & 2c2 (PQC), 2c3 (LWC), 2c4 (Validation), 2a0 (PEC tools), 3a0 (gadgets).
Intros about the threshold-crypto project or call: [2019] I1.1, [2020] 1a1; [2023] 101.
Legend of indices:
- For NTCW 2019, indices are Xyz, with X in {I, II} (day), y in {1,…,5} (session in the day), z in {1,2,3}.
- For MPTS 2020 and MPTS 2023, indices are xyz, with x in {0, 1,2,3} (day), y in {a,b,c,d} (session in the day), z in {0,…,5}.
Security and Privacy: digital signatures, encryption, key management, message authentication, post-quantum cryptography, secure hashing
Activities and Products: standards development